INTRODUCTION
. Whit e wrote a series of editorials in The New Yorker magazine supporting democratic federal world government. In his editorial of June 1, 1946, he wrote:
World government is an appalling prospect. ... Certainly th e world is not ready for govcrmncnt on a planetary scale. In our opinion, it will never be ready. Th e test is whether the people will chance it anyway --lik e childr en who hear t he familiar cry, 'Com ing whether ready or not!' At a Federalist convention the other day, Dean Katz of the University of Chica go said, 'Const itutions have never awaited the achievement of trust and a matured sense of community; th ey have been born of conflicts between groups which have found a basis for union in spite of deep suspicions and distrusts.' The only condition mor e appalling, less practical, than world govcrmncnt is the lack of it in this atomic age. In fact, the issue is not whether we shall be governed globally, but rather by whom and on what basis. The international realm is not one of anarchy as the realists would have us believe, but rath er one of order: of rules, procedures and accepted norms of behavior associated in part with what arc termed "international regimes" (Krasner 1983) , each dedicated in principle to a separate functional domain. Global gove rnance is not something that is to be created, but rather something to be altered in the public interest. The governance of the globe is currently configured by a shifting set of ill-coordinated actors : among them the one remaining super -power and, to a lesser extent, other strong states, as well as powerfu l indi viduals and a number of large transnational corporat ions and financial institutions. Whereas Le Mondc Diplomatiquc (1995) speaks oflcs nouveaux maitrcs du mondc, Robert Cox has summed up our current system of global governance with the phrase nebuleuse: "There is, in effect, no explicit political or authority structure for the global economy. There is, nevertheless, something there that remains to be deciphered, something that could be described by the French word nebulcusc or by the notion of 'governance without government." ' (1992 / 1996: 3 ll) [l] [Page 321]
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Our current system of global governance is one of rule by the few. While an incrca..:;ing number of the world's countries arc procedural or even substantive democracies, global governance is far from democratic. Moreover, those international institutions where diverse voices arc heard arc precisely those with not only the lea..:;t power to act on matters of substance, but with the most precarious financing. Imagine what the circumstances of national federal governments would be today if they had to rely for funds on a combination of voluntary a..:;scssmcnts and proceeds from the sale of greeting cards. Without both cooperation and funding by the US, actions approved in the UN General Assembly are essentially dead letters. The mid-l 970s General Assembly resolutions creating a New International Economic Order (Resolutions 3201 and 3202 , 6th Special Session, May l, 1974) , and that proclaiming the Economic Rights and Duties of States (Resolution 3281, 29th Session, December 12, 1974) were doomed by the de facto veto of the US before they were even approved. In the International Monetary Fund the US ha..:; had a de jurc veto on matters requiring a special majority ( of first 80% and later 85%) of the weighted votes since the Fund wa..:; created at Brctton Woods in 1944 ba..:;cd largely on the American drafted proposal. Delays by the US in approving subsequent incrca..:;cs in country quota..:; (the source of the Fund's own resources) have been a key element in the conversion over the years of the IMF from a credit union to a powerful global financial watchdog. (Kcncn 1989) Like it or not , we have a global culture, one which the governing few have had a major hand in shaping. If we consider a culture to be characterized a..:; a network of conversations, then it follows that cultures change with alterations in the content of the conversations. (Maturana 1995: 132) Conversations, and hence cultures, ha ve changed throughout the world both by chance and by systematic orchestration by powerful private interests . (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Marchak 1991; Saul 1995) [Page 322] Journal of World-Systems Research A..: ; th e evolving global culture is one that presently celebrates individual rights without responsibilities, we have witnessed over the pa..:;t two decades substantial incr ca..:; es in inequality of wealth and income. Comparative international data on income dispariti es arc at best fragmentary and ofrcccnt vintage, but one estimate of the ratio of th e income of the richest 20% to that of the poorest 20% of the world's population, based on a ranking by national average income, suggests a gap which widened from 30/ 1 in 1960 to 59/ l in 1989 . (United Nations Development Programme 1992 An account in a joint IMF-World Bank journal even counsels us to forget incom e convergence between countries and even regionally within developing countries, unless there arc "serious changes in economic policies" in those countries. (Pritchett 1996: 43) The Human Development Report 1996 identifies a number of types of prominent growth patterns, among them jobless growth, voiceless growth, rootless growth, futurclcss grO\vth and ruthless growth. A..:;sociatcd with "ruthless growth" was an absolute decline of the per capita income of one billion people over the period 1980 -93 (UNDP 1996 : 2) A recent evaluation for the United States showed that between 1976 and 1989 the share of the nation's net wealth held by the richest 1% of the country's households had increased from 21% to 36%, reversing a prior decade-long decline. (Wolff 1995: 67) Past gains in income, job security and access to social services, often achieved by way of concerted political action, have been weakened, if not actually swept aside.
NATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS TO GLOBALISM
Robert Gilpin has characterized our current predicament as being the dilemma of the limits of national welfare capitalism in a non-welfare international capitalist world . (1987: 60-64 ) W c live in an integrated world economy with few effective control mechanisms to provide offacts to the varied national impacts of global economic activities. Indeed, governments, acting in response to external constraints, pursue strategics that reinforce some of the adverse national consequences. Andre Drainville has elaborated on this in his description of global accumulation being validated politically by state-bound democracies and on their ability to strike social compromises. Drawing on Desm ond King, Drainville describes how citizens arc called upon to embrace economic rationality and "lead the assault on ... the social rights of citizenship". (l 995: 60) [Page 323]
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People cannot be counted on, however, to faithfully function indefinitely in the interests of global accumulation. As the divergence-widening effects of the current scheme of global governance with its supporting national manifestations become mor e and mor e obvious, reactions begin to set in. One common reaction is to point to "others" a..:; being the threat to one's j ob (Richmond 1994) . But immigration controls arc not a solution to the employment problem, which is but one of a range of human interact ions which can only be dealt with successfully by collective action on a global scale. The insistence that national solutions be sought to problems generated by global accumulation is essentially a recipe to "divide and conquer." Combining a closing of borders to immigration with an insistence that poor countries resolve th eir own problem..:; serves to exacerbate two of the elements (population pressure and inequality) which Christopher Cha..,c -Dunn and Bruce Podobnik have identified a.., causal factors heightening the probability of future "core wars". (1995: 13) The Latin Americans have invented a word to describe a procedural democracy where participation is not merely limited, but actively suppressed: a dcmocradura --hard democracy. (O'Donnell and Schmittcr 1986: 4l) In its original usage the phra..,c referred to a pact between civil authorities and the military to establish limited democracy. The term seems more broadly applicable: arc we not already seeing the signs of an emerging dcmocradura in a number of northern countries, including Canada, as the will to maintain social programs erodes? (Greider 1992; Saul 1995) The limits on state action arising from the (real or anticipated) hypersensitivity of financial markets ha.., led to what Susan Strange ha.., called the end of opposition from established parties: differences between policies of government and opposition parties disappear, a.., "society, economy and authority arc no longer bound by the frontiers of the territorial state." (Strange 1995: 291,30 l) One ha..,tcns to add that where opposition docs remain, it is treated a.., a fringe ( either dangerous or irrelevant) that unrealistically refuses to accept the new and ( ostensibly) immutable circumstances of state limits.
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RESPONDING GLOBALLY
Paradoxically, if we arc to save the world from breakdown occasioned by capitalism, we must once again save the capitalists from their global excesses, ju st as the earlier creation of national welfare states saved the capitalists from their excesses at the national level. The same logic that propelled the creation of the welfare state and the extension of democracy at the national level, now must be extended to the global level, not with th e express purpose of making the world safe for capitalism, although that may be the effect, but rather to make the world safe: safe for the common person, safe for civil rights, safe for our children and grandchildren, safe for the flora and fauna.
A welfare state, whether national or global, requires a structure of govern ment to shape the programs , to financ e them, and to respond to changed circumstances. The difficul ty which confron ts us in our current situation is that our ability to act at the global level is severel y restr icted by an institutional framework with limited responsiveness, owing to the reca lcitranc e of major powe rs. We arc limited as well by our mi spcrccption that trying to solve problems at the national level is wholly appropriate for most issues.
Our tacit or overt acceptance of functional globalism, of the sort proposed by Daniel Mitrany (1943) , that pretends that most issues of global significanc e arc purely technical and best left to experts represen ts another major limi t . In fact, few problems arc purely technical. Wherever there is a human dimen sion to a deci sion, discretion and preferences enter into play; we leave the realm of the exact and enter the realm of the political. To capitulate to the claims that only the experts can decide, for example, a.:; in the current conventional wisdom regarding independence of central banks (Eij ffingcr and De Haan 1996; Gormley and De Haan 1996) and the llvIF, is to concede to a select group sovereign rights, which few of the world's remaining monarchs even ex ercise . Political problems require political solutions within a context where a range of opinions can be heard . Those which are global problem.:; require global political solution s.
[ W . W arren Wagar dismiss ed federalism and world federalism one-quart er century ago: the former a.:; "so much cold mutton in the second half of the twe ntieth [century]"; the latt er a.:; a project that feeds "on a wide a.:;sortmcnt of deadly illu sions", yet whose followers were regarded a.:; so harmless (at the time) that "gove rnm ents let them continu e unmolest ed and unnotic ed. " (Wa gar 197 1: 32-36) Is there rea.:;o n to believe that federa list structur es offer any promis e today in dealin g with our problem.:;? Federalism w ithin nations ha.:; been given an impetus by the neo -liberal empha.:;is on the downsizing of the state and its a.:;soci ated realloca tion of functi ons from the center to the reg ion s. Supranation al federa lism within the European Union (EU) ha.:; found stron g support in regions, like Catalonia, whos e relations wi th their national capitals have been marked hist orica lly by tensions. In a fanciful scenar io Wagar sug gests that a world state --the Commonw ealth --mi ght emerge throu gh the voluntary a.:;sociation of a grow ing numb er of stat es with "World Party " govern ments . He admits that he currently secs no inklin g of a World Party on the po litical hori zon. (W agar 1996: 10-15) Is it any mor e far-fetch ed t o imagin e tha t the once 6 member European Common Mark et , now 15 member Europ ean Union, which already ha.:; over a dozen willin g adherent.:; at its doorstep [2], mi ght eventually through a continu ous process of exp ansion and structural modificat ion includ e all of the world's people and come to be "known simply" a.:; th e Union , with the Union Parliam ent representing the peop le of the various members, a.:; does the EU Parli am ent today, and not their nationa l gove rnm ent.:;? [Page 326] 
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What is new today is the urgency and the possibility for bringing the project into being. Consider the logistics of bringing together the American Founding Fathers in Philadelphia in 1776 or the Fathers of Canadian Confederation in Charlottetown, Princ e Edward Island in 1867. Even bringing delegates to San Francisco in 1945 wa-; a major undertaking. To physically convene today a representative cross section of the human population would be child's play compared to these earlier a-;semblies.
Logistics is obviously not the issue; the issue is always one of will, which would appear to be growing daily with our expanding sense of the global interdep endence of a host of urgent issues. We have already witnessed several instances of the gathering of appreciable numbers of citizen dcle gates at unofficial meetings that have paralleled major world summits, including some 30,000 women, representing 2,000 NGOs at the Women's Forum which paralleled the September 1995 Beijing United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women. The elaboration of numerous alternative treaties at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro United Nations Conference on Environment and Development --the Earth Summit --by the Int ernational Forum of NGOs and Social Movements (Foro Internacional 1993) is but one additional indication that the time may have arrived for the people of the world to take bolder action to wrest control of global processes from les nouveaux maitr es du monde. NGO repres entation, both official and unofficial, at world summits ha-; the potential to transform politics; to create a global politics where the people have voice to complement international fora where only states have voice.
Preoccupations with the possibility of dcva-;tating war and the escalating costs of deterrence, with the attendant neglect of social needs, also focus attention on global institut ion building to maintain and extend world peace. World Systems theorists who have studied Kondratiefflong economic cycles (K-Waves) have been struck by the persistently recurring int eraction between war and economic growth processes. (Goldstein 1988) Cha-; c-Dunn and Podobnik see the current K-Wavc leading to a 50-50 likelihood of a core war in the 2020s decade and urge us to continue laborin g to avoid that eventuality (1995: 32) George Modclsk:i and William R. Thomp son wonder w hether the current nineteenth K-Wavc might avoid an a-;sociatcd global war given, inter alia, "denat ionaliz ed industrial production, incr ea-; cd political management capacities on the part of international organizations, and the continuing diffusion of democratic institutions." (1996 : 225) Their message is a clear one: there is continuing effort to be made if war is to be avoided. However, a-; Wagar reminds us, peace, like happiness, is a by-product; it is the creation of a "new world civilization" that is the work at hand. (1971: 36) [Page 327]
Returning to the factors identified by Cha<;c-Dunn and Podobnik a<; either exacerbating or mitigating the likelihood of a major war; inequality, international economic integration, international political integration and disarmament (1995: 13) arc all area<; where substituting the voice of global citizens for the voice of national interests might well move us forward. A<; Jmmanuel Wallcrstcin put<; it: "Perhaps we should tiptoe into an uncertain future, trying merely to remember in which direction we arc going." (l 991: 229). To build a global federal structure may be our best guarantee to a<;surc that we can preserve that which is of value that is close to us and to permit the directional shifts perceived to be necessary when we appear to be veering off course.
If we achieve global democratic federalism, the eventual form will reflect the outcome of lengthy political processes, with variations from one level of the hierarchy to another and from one jurisdiction to another at the same level. There is no rca<;on to believe that existing differences in federal structures between countries will disappear, nor any way to predict what form will emerge at the global level. W c might see a greatly strengthened United Nations, but this is unlikely to help us much with our dilemma<; born ofneolibcralism, unless there is a major sea change in the visions of national governments. A People's A<;scmbly that would provide the UN with a bicameral legislative structur e might well be a possible scenario. Citizen involvement and a global a<;s embly of representatives of the world's people could be an important counter weight to a system where states have the sole voice. (Heinrich 1992; Held 1995: 278-83; Wagar 1996) For a<; Claude Julien remind<; us: "States don't have friend<;; they have interests ." (1996: 16) For Canadians, envisioning forms for global federal structures should come a<; naturally a<; getting out of bed in the morning.
Let us not be timid about global government. 1 subscribe in principle to the notion of subsidiarity, but what ha<; been called marble cake federalism is more likely to be the working result. Responsibilities may rest at a particular level, but higher levels do not keep silent when problems arise. Similarly, pressures may also go from a lower level to a higher level a<; new tensions emerge. The point of democratic institutions is precis ely not to freeze important elements of the structure of governance indefinitely because of the de facto or de jurc veto of a key player.
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THE CENTRALITY OF CITIZENS
The phra<;c democratic deficit is used with frequency in the context of European integration to focus attention on the relative exclusion of the people from the shaping of a united European. (Fischer 1995: 203-222; Norton 1996: 177-93) Those who speak of a democratic deficit seek to provide Europeans with both responsibilities and an effective voice in the conduct of the affairs of the Union . However important the right to a European pa..:;sport and free movement within the Union may be, a Europe of th e people depends on the individual exercise of collective responsibilities with one's counterparts in other European countries. This is one of the messages that ha..:; appeared in a series of monthly articles on European citizenship ("Unc Europe des Citoycns") between March and June 1996 in Le Mondc Diplomatiquc. Articles in the May issu e by Pierre Behar (1996) and Paul Thibaud (1996) support a federal Europe in which citizens play an important role and both refer to that a..:; having been the vision of General de Gaulle.
Drainville ha..:; raised important questions about "construction of citizenship in the world economy", suggesting that in fact citizens arc presently banished from the space of the world economy. (1995: 71) As Drainville observes, "there is something radically important about conceptualizing the world economy a..:; a social space in the making ." (1995: 70) The very act of describing serves to alter; the act of naming can create. To sec our current situation a..:; one of exclusionary global governance is to raise the possibility of action. Drainville speak..:; of reconstructing, reimagining and remapping world politics. (1995: 70) That is precisely the ta..:;k: to create a real "world politics" which would give substance to a phra..:;c that ha..:; long been a misnomer. What we label today a..:; world politics is in fact the realm of anti-politics (Ferguson 1990; Mulgan 1994) , of th e experts and of the diplomats whose instructions carefully delineate their limits . Th e NGOs represents an ongoing important stepping stone in the broadening of world politics and in the construction of world citizenship. Their achievements should renew our hope that what appear to be oppressive and unchanging structures arc in reality processes in motion and strengthen our resolve to continue our collective efforts.
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Journa I of World-Systems Research
Those who reject supranational government a..:; escapism would appear to be affirming that citizen participation is a well-established reality in most of the world's democracies and that citizens acting through their governments arc equa l to the ta..:;k at hand . In fact, democratic deficits arc ubiquitous and have been growing with the advance of ncolibcralism . To the best of my knowledge democratic deficit s arc not mca..:;ur cd, not reported, and not the object of serious criticism in the way that governm ent budget deficits arc . Indeed were national democratic deficits to be reduced markedly, the hysteria concernin g fiscal deficit..:; and the size of the state might well be dispelled a..:; an outcome of the resulting public debates. It is not only regional citizens and world citizens that arc to be created, but true national and local citizens must also be either created or recreated. Mitrany suggested that "the performance of a number of common functions is the way to create anonnal community. " (Mitrany in Long 1993: 371) For too long now we have been witnessing the disappearance of common functions. Our c hall cngc today is to create a world in which the number of common functions performed by individuals is markedly expanded in order to swell the rank..:; of the politic ally active at all levels.
The ta..,k confronting the peoples of the world is the major one of changing perceptions of the nature of our current reality and then changing behavior to join in and create a public debate at all levels and to engage in political action: that is the new world civilization and it is already in formation . Nor is the "Academy" being left in the dust: a keyword search of the on-line public access catalogue of any major university library will identi fy an outpouring of new publications dealing with either global governance or democracy, far too numerous to list here . Civil society must either be created or strengthened everywhere. The democratic deficit is partly of our own making in so far a.., we have cca..,cd to behave collectively. Our myopia, cynicism, withdrawal, avoidance of coll ective responsibility, and deference to authority and technical experts have been carefully nurtured by an educational system in the service of nationalism. W c often hear attributed to H.G . Wells a phra..,c relating to the race between education and cata..,trophe. In fact, where Well..,' sentiment appears in context, we find that he addresses the evils of nationalism and of education distorted by those who choose to use nationalism for personal advantage. (Wells 1932: 650) Most ofus arc products of an educational system that ha.., done its best through pa..,s ive learning to neutralize knowl edge and of a society with an anti-political bent. That many ofus arc, nonetheless, activ e and political is a tribute to the resilience of the human spirit ofjustice and gives yet additional cause for hope . Moreover, even in the classroom, professing is increasingl y giving way to facilitating. The spreading cmpha..,is on participation leaves few ofus unchan ged.
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The construction of meaningful world citizenship is not likely to be a direct by-product of "globalization from above." Indeed, meaningful citizenship at whatever level is unlikely to result from the activities of th e ne buleuse, which tend not to focus on part icip atory democracy, but rather on "good governance", which is something said to be expressed by a ratio of government expenditure to gross product. The construction of meaningful world citizenship is taking place daily . "Globalization from below" with its daily crossbordcr, cross-cultural interactions, is the incessant process by which our mental images arc being altered. Conscious perceptions may not matter in the early stages of formation of our sense of planet-wide interdependence . The process is in motion and the participant.., may only be dimly aware of the transition of which they are currentl y part.
We have yet to recognize the opportunities that arc arising daily. Th ere arc limit s t o the role of civil society at all levels, especially at the transnational or global level, but the frontier of action is an ever-changing one. In an era of positive-feedback, particularly nourished by electronic communications, those limits can change swiftl y; witness the events following Perestroika and, less than five years later, the fall of the B erlin Wall.
To get from here to there will require major efforts to spread the word: we live on one small planet and we arc one people with a common culture . We may speak different languages, we may have distinct local custom..,, we may look different, but we are one. Those ofu s commi tted to saving local autonomy, must support efforts to strengthen the global umbrella. Elise Boulding (1988) has written of crafting a global civil society. The time has come to craft as well the global democratic federal structures of governance to go with that. If individuals become citizens instead of onlookers, then the prospect of the public and the political spaces becoming far more active venu es could well mean the death of expert-driven exclusionary anti-politics where decisions currently masqu erade as technical necessities.
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CONCLUSION
I think it appropriate to note that I wholeheartedly support the idea of global taxation and redistribution, essential elements for reducing inequality. (Frank.man 1996) Nonethel ess, I reject the global tax proposal which seems to have achieved the most popularity of late, the Tobin Tax ofup to 0.5% of the value ofcach foreign exchange transaction, insofar a<; it deals with effects and not causes. Tobin's original intent wa<; not to raise revenue, but to "throw sand in the wheels of international finance". By 1995 foreign exchang e transactions were estimated to exceed US$1.2 trillion per day. This hypennobility of capital repres ent<; a veritable sword of Damocles perceived to threaten any gove rnment contemplating mca<;urcs that diverge from the current mark. ct conception of proper public sector behavior. (Haq, Kaul and Grunberg 1996) .
I favor instead the creation of a singl e world currency with appropriat e supporting institutions, which, incidentall y, is James Tobin's preferred scenario: according to Tobin the best solution would be "a common currency, common monetary and fiscal policy, and economic integration ." (Tobin 1978: 154) . The "freedom" to devalue that a separat e currency accords to a nation offers no guarantee that generalized benefits will be realized. (Bourgignon, de Melo & Morris son, 1991) Insofar a<; exchange rat es play a key role in the frantic quest for national competitiveness, international economic integrat ion that brings their elimination, if accompanied where necessary by appropriate offsets, further reduce s the likelihood of war.
One ingredient is not made explicit in Tobin's list: global democratic institutions that presumabl y would shape a fiscal policy to meet the needs of disadvantage d individuals and regions wherever they may be, just a<; national institutions presently serve that function with varying degrees of success . My own work on the global economy ha<; brought me to cross the line from the technical to the political. Instituti ons intended to achieve global social jus tice must be embedded in a global political system where the peoples of the world can give expression to their will in a democratic context. The political awareness that is necessary to rescue the state, currentl y under both strain and merciless attack, is the very same awareness that is necessary to construct political democracy at all level<; of the hierarchy. What is need ed is not a blind allegiance to the Father Land or the Mother Country, right or wrong, but an appreciation of the shifting limits of sovereignty and of the ever-shifting locus for action in distinct problem areas.
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Political awakening a ... sociatcd with a local issue may be the start of a long march toward support for global government, given the clear line of causation from supposed inevitabilities at the local level to power relationships extending to the global scale. To the extent that the fallout of nco-libcral economic policy reawak ens collectiv e action, th e next round may well feature a broadened focus, extending from the local to th e global, in recognition of our interdependence and the common problems we confront around the world, whose resolution lies beyond local jurisdiction. That common perception is th e current reality of the many NGO members who network regularly with counterparts in many countries of the world.
In the very first paper that I presented on global taxation in 1970, I closed with the following quote from Bertrand Russell: "It is not by pacifist sentiment, but by world-wid e economic organization, that civilized mankind is to be saved from collective suicid e." (Russell 1934: 510; Frankman 1971 ) Today, it is clear to me that Russell specifi ed a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one for avoiding collective suicide. For E .B. White, the sufficient condition wa.., unambiguous: "Peac e is the product of responsible government." (Whit e: 41) That ideal must be our continuing objectiv e a.., edu cators and citizens if the promise of no global war is to be reali zed for the 19th and subsequent Kwavc s.
END-NOTES
l. And: "Far from being a sinister occult power , the nebulcusc may turn out to be a Wizard of Oz. Perhaps no one, or no coherent structure, is really in control. " For Cox, Le Mondc Diplomatiquc's phra..,c "conjures up a coherent strategy of dominance, virtually a conspiracy." (Cox 1996: E-Mail) 2. Eurobaromctcr sampl ed opinion within the EU countries a.., to the willingn ess in 1995 of respondents to sec each of 24 European countries join the Union in the future. Spanish respond ents were the most generally favorable to expansion in that they were amenab le to admitting most of the countries; their lowest score wa.., 44 % in favor of admitting Latvia. (1996: 862-63) [ 
Reviewed by Terry Boswell, Emory University
For the last several years I have begun several papers on global hegemony and leadership by contrasting the Long Cycle perspective ofModelsk:i and Thompson with the World Economy perspective of Wallcrstcin, Chase-Dunn, and others. At first, this was an easy contrast. While there was always much overlap, the Long Cycle school emphasized world order produced by a world leader with over half the world's naval power. The world economy school emphasized economic dominance over finance, trade, and production, or in some variants, over leading economic sectors. This difference in emphasis allowed me to set up contrasting propositions from the theories that could be tested empirically.
Unfortunately, with this book, the difference in perspectives narrows substantially and I will have to revise my papers substantially. While their earlier work alluded to economic processes, with this book the emphasis shifts rather dramatically from sea power to leading economic sectors. It is a shift that I wholeheartedly applaud. Their discussion of economic and political coordination, as opposed to focusing on one or the other, raises the level of debate to a more sophisticated level. In addition, I find that determining leadership in terms of dominance over leading sectors, which includes the concept to long waves, to be more convincing historically than arguments about simultaneous dominance in finance, trade and production. I also find it more convincing logically as a causal theory, as they now incorporate innovation, than their own past work, which had a functionalist tinge. While they arc not alone in advocating leading sector theory, they have amassed an impressive data set to support their claims. The book is a worthy contribution of those grounds alone.
Given this convergence of emphasis, and I should add that World Economy theorists have become more political, arc there still important differences between the two schools of thought? Or in other words, can I still salvage my papers? The answer, thank god, is yes.
The most important differences arc the following: I .Is global war necessary for leadership and can a global war occur without producing a leader? 2. Arc there 3 hcgcmons or 5 leaders after 1500? 3. Were there world leaders prior to 1500? and 4. Docs the modern world-system originate around year 1500 or year I 000?
[Page 339] Journal of World-Systems Research I. Global war is still a necessary part of leadership for long cycle theory, but only a likely probability for world economy theory. Global wars, those wars fought between great powers in which world leadership is contested, arc only included in their study if the war produced a world leader. This makes for a tautological relationship between leadership and war, a problem world economy theory avoids by making a clearer separation between economic hegemony and world leadership. Levy, for instance, lists 5 global wars that Modelski and Thompson ignore. They even leave out the Thirty Y cars War, which wa~ one of the world's most dcva~tating and most politically important wars prior to 1914. Perhaps their next book will explain why this and other global wars arc not included and how their theory would account for them.
2. World economy theory finds 3 hcgcmons since 1500, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States. Long cycle finds 5 world leaders, the same three plus an 18th century British leadership and a 16th century Portuguese one. The difference, of course, is in how one defines hegemony, leadership and leading economic sectors. On page 83, Modelski and Thompson say that "Global system leaders arc not hcgcmons. They do not dominate all economic and political activity." But this is a straw man version of hegemony. Let us take a leading sector version, where hegemony is dominating (i.e., over 1/2) leading economic sectors. Then hegemony and leadership should be about the same, except that Mode Md and Thompson still use sea power to date hcgcmons, rather than their own data on leading sectors. 3. They also have 2-5 possible leaders before 1500. I must admit in being a bit confused in reading their book a~ to these early world leaders. Table 8 .5 lists Northern Sung, Southern Sung, Genoa, and Venice. Table 9 .4 list~ the same except it adds the Mongol world empire and drops Genoa. World economy theory, at lea~t until recently, drew a distinction between world empires and world-systems that would exclude most of their early ca~cs, although I must admit, not all of them.
[Page 340] Journal of World-Systems Research 4. World economy theory also drew a distinction between the capitalist world system, where one has accumulation of profits from commodity exchange of necessities, versus coercive accumulation or preciosity exchange in other systems. The capitalist world system emerges in the period of 1450 to 1650, with a decisive turning point around 1500 with the European discovery and conquest of the Americas. Modelsk:i and Thompson note that the key clement to this distinction is a world market that connects political units into a system, over which a state can lead, but is incapable of subsuming other units into an empire. With a world market, one has a transition belt for innovations, and thus the emergence of economic long waves. They claim that a world market began in China around the year 1000. Some of this difference is over amounts or degrees --to what extent were market relations central prior to 1500, did they include necessities, was the market fully a world one?. Other theorists, such A.G. Frank, drop the question of necessities as a bogus distinction, and can thus find a world system that stretches back another 5000 years. This leads to a necessary, and so far unresolved, debate over what constitutes a system. We cannot resolve this issue here, but let me throw a wrinkle in the prc-1500 versions. Starting around 1550, with the long rise of Dutch hegemony, sea trade begins to climb at an exponential rate. This not only changes the basis on wealth in the European core from political power to economic efficiency, but the core states go on to subjugate the rest of the world through colonial conquest. No previous period of world history is comparable. There is a profound qualitative transformation around 1500 in the amount of trade and in its political and social importance, a transformation made more obvious, ironically, by knowing that a world market had existed for 500 years prior or that some sort of system or network existed for 5000 years prior, yet without a similar qualitative change occurring. Capitalism is a fine name for the change as far as I am concerned, but call it what you want, the transformation still must be explained. Reviewed by Robert Dcncmark, Political Science, University of Delwarc.
LEADING SECTORS AND WORLD POWERS is the latest entry in a growing literature on the social science oflong term change. It well illustrates the increasing quality and sophistication of that effort. George Modelsk:i and William R. Thompson address the interaction of economic growth, political leadership and systemic war. This is not a new question, and some 40 alternative treatment~ arc reviewed in a highly efficient manner.
Modelsk:i and Thompson find order where others have not in part by avoiding some a priori biases. While they look at nation-states, they arc not trapped by national level boundaries. Some of the relevant variables come in nation-state packages, but just as many arc either sub-or supranational. Nation-states arc not rcificd, nor for that matter is the global system.
The authors also refuse to take the boundaries of "capitalism" as their necessary limits. A central focus of their model is innovation, which they wisely recognize in both its commercial and its technological forms. Since innovations can affect all market systems, not just those of 'capitalist' or 'industrial' periods, Modcl~k:i and Thompson arc not constrained by any of the dates variously associated with those eras. They instead follow Mc Neill's (1982) suggestion that the modern market system emerged in China around the 10th century, and extend their analysis to that point.
Finally, Modcl~k:i and Thompson ignore the warnings of scholars from Kondraticff and Schumpctcr forward who complain that the data necessary to establish longer term cycles or trends is simply not available. They arc successful in gathering an impressive array of data for the post-1500 period, and in putting together an informative narrative account ofK-wavcs and system leadership for the 500 years preceding that point as well. The result is a global level treatment of broad processes over the very long term. Modelsk:i and Thompson prove that with some effort, the historical record can be made to yield far more specific information than most might imagine.
Political and economic cycles rest at the heart of their model. Fifty to sixty year long Kondraticff (K-) waves arc said to be initiated by the bunching of innovations. Growth slows when diffusion or competition reduces returns. One hundred to one hundred twenty year long leadership cycles arc also identified. These include phases of agenda setting, coalition building, macro decision, and global leadership.
These two sets of cycles arc said to cocvolvc. Innovations generate economic growth and wealth. Increasing wealth provides the incentive to seek to structure the global system, along with the resources needed to engage in agenda setting and coalition building. With growth comes competition among great powers over which will make the rules. This competition, or the fear of falling behind, provides the impetus to war.
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War retards economic growth, in no small part by inhibiting trade. It also dctcnnincs which state will next lead the system. As a result the downturn is relatively short. With key competitors out of the picture, markets reopening, and the conversion of war-time innovations to new purposes, we find the start of a new K-wavc. This second wave is likely to be founded in part upon the fundamental innovations of the first.
Global leadership declines as the second K-wavc abates. The global order breaks down. W c enter new eras of agenda sc tting and coalition building. Though it is possible for the lead economy to reproduce itself, this is unusual. Older technology and older solutions become standard fare in the lead economy. Sunk costs retard the use of newer innovations. New problems, new markets and new resources arc likely to form the foundation for the next innovation driven K-wavc.
Modelski and Thompson identify four attributes that facilitate the rise of a new lead state. It must be one of the existing major economics, as some participation in previous K-wavc upswings provide necessary levels of wealth. It must have a strong military with the ability to extend its power. This is defined in terms of naval strength, which continues to be a vital asset even in the age of air power. It is likely to have a relatively open society, which Modclski and Thompson argue will aid in the creation and adoption of innovations, in the setting of global agendas, and in coalition building. A general sense of responsiveness to global problems is identified as the fourth important attribute.
The finished model includes two K-wavcs which animate one long cycle of political leadership. The first wave provides the resources necessary for successful agenda setting and coalition building, and peaks before a major war. The war decides the question of system leadership, and slows the economy. The new leader emerges with a preponderance (50% plus) of global naval capacity. A second K-wavc follows the war. As it slows, political leadership is contested, disorder incrca~cs, and new innovations emerge to provide one of the major economics with the resources necessary to prevail.
Empirical analyses of each of these predictions arc undertaken. More formal data arc used for the post 1500 period, about which information is more available and comparable. The hypothesized temporal ordering among innovation ba~cd economic upswings, war, and naval supremacy, is well supported. Equally supportive arc the narrative chapters on Sung China and the northern Italian city-states of the Renaissance. Both the K-wavc and leadership cycles arc well illustrated.
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Renaissance Italy is linked to Asian markets and technology, and serves to translate the K-wavc and political cycle phenomena from China to Europe. lt is good to have a picture of how the K-wavc and long political leadership cycle came to Europe, which shortly after grew to prominence. Nonetheless it seems that "global" leadership never really rested in northern Italy in anything like the manner that it belonged to the Chinese or even the Dutch. There may be more to be found in Asia, at lea~t about K-wavcs, and that would make Modelsk:i and Thompson's transition to a Euroccntcrcd analysis in the early 1400s a bit premature.
By the end of the two empirical sections little doubt remains a~ to the existence of both K-wavcs and long leadership cycles prior to the onset of capitalism. Relevant data arc available and supportive, and Modcl~k:i and Thompson use them in a clear and efficient manner.
The review of the relevant literature, the building of the model, and the sections on verification arc all well and precisely written. Definitions arc clear, chosen mca~urcs arc well conceived, and the book is written with precision. lf anything it is perhaps a bit too sparing. For example, more information on how innovation wa~ defined and the manner in which data on innovation were gathered would have been helpful. lt is clear that Modcl~k:i and Thompson do not fall into the trap of simply identifying the times and places where we might expect innovations to emerge and searching for them only then and there. But they fail to tell us enough about their search. Innovation emerges a~ a central dynamic, and the work would have been stronger ifwc were told us more about it.
Chapter 8 of the book, nestled between the end of the data based chapters and the beginning of the more narrative account~, has two parts. Its methodological half is designed to deal with criticisms of structural analysis and introduce the concept of social evolution. Its other half seeks to place this study of roughly 1000 years into an even broader picture of human history.
Macro level analyses arc more and more subject to the criticism that they arc illegitimate because they lack a microfoundational base. Most of these criticisms, based on the arguments of methodological individualists, arc devoid of merit. But more subtle criticisms exist that warrant consideration. How, for example, docs one decide among competing structural level theories when they arc indeterminate, that is when they fail to make unique predictions? In such a case, a resort to individual level or microfoundational analysis would provide an additional layer of analysis by which to judge. There is also the unfortunate tendency for older structural and cyclical analyses to adopt a deterministic air. Micro foundational groundings can help guard against this as well. Modelski and Thompson do an excellent job of avoiding both of these problems, in part by leaving the door open to micro-level considerations. They trace the impetus to innovate to the individual level, and arc quick to acknowledge the ability of individuals to recognize and perhaps even ameliorate tendencies toward systemic war that their model predicts for the years around 2030. While methodological individualists might still call them bad names, no sophisticated student of social science methodology will miss the quality of their arguments in this regard.
[Page 344] Journal of World-Systems Research A sense of social evolution provides this work's guiding methodology. The authors show that social evolution need not be teleological or directional. Instead, and contrary to rational choice methods, social evolution stresses changeable preferences and constraints, trial and error, a focus on institutions, transitions, and the long term. This is well illustrated by K-wavc dynamics:
... each K-wavc builds on the conditions created by earlier innovations, and in its tum, gives rise to problem~ that future innovations will have to resolve ... K-wavcs arc both path-dependent and future oriented and they arc best understood if viewed in clusters (p. 130). The result is a superior method of understanding social processes that is historically sensitive, avoids the fallacy of determinism, and allows for a holistic apprehension of its subject. My main concern is that the few pages devoted to the discussion of social evolution arc once again too few. lt is an important methodology about which more ought be said. Modelsk:i's recent work on evolutionary paradigms in the social sciences, (Modelsk:i and Poznansk:i (1996) and Modcl~k:i (1996) would be well considered prior to reading this longer volume.
Chapter 8 also introduces a longer term historical-evolutionary perspective. Four K-wavcs may be grouped into a "period" with innovations that share a common thematic underpinning and with their own structure of base building, networking, breakthrough and payoff. Four "periods" make up an even longer "global economy process." These global economy processes arc also paired, the first laying the foundation for the full development of the second. The whole evolutionary schema is suggested to extend in roughly 1000 year increments from the 3,500 BCE onset of the Bronze Age through the latest, which began about 1850.
This broader perspective is boldly conceived. lt faces two problems. The first is familiar. Too few pages arc devoted to it. The second is more problematic. The division of human history into neatly packaged 50/60, 100/120, 200/240, and approximately 1000 year increments seems all too handy. What explains this temporal uniformity across so long a sweep of human history? ls it something inherent in the dynamics of innovation, which then provide a more or less stable 50 to 60 year K-wavc foundation for the longer periods and eras? Could it be something else? Nowhere in this work, to its great credit, is there much hint of teleology or determinism. What then drives such apparently uniform cycles with their provocatively round numbers? lt is a paradox the authors must eventually address.
The final chapter concerns the future, where information technology not surprisingly emerges as the next lead sector, and the U.S. and Japan struggle for lead state status. lt is alternately possible, according to the authors, that globalization may make national leadership obsolete.
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Of far greater concern is the coming macro-decision phase. The dual K-wavcs of the U.S. political leadership cycle have passed, and a new wave began in 1973. We ought be experiencing upheaval and dislocations of various sorts, then new periods of agenda setting and coalition building. The macro-decision phase, traditionally associated with global war, ought be upon us about 2030. Such a war would be tremendously destructive. The authors arc quick to remind us that within their framework nothing is inevitable. Modelski and Thompson consider the arguments against such a war: weapons systems arc increasingly lethal, leadership denationalization may obviate war as an instrument of transition, larger international organizations may prove better tension managers, or the diffusion of democracy might enlarge the "zone of peace." Anything remains possible. This is an excellent work. It is provocative, well conceived, carefully executed, and precisely written. It raises fascinating questions and provides interesting tool~ with which to address them. Both its substance and its methods will be of interest to social scientist~ from a variety of fields. This work has a lot to say to all ofus. Reviewed by Gerardo Otero, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Simon Fra~icr University, Burnbay, British Columbia, CANADA Barbara Stallings and collaborators have produced an extremely useful synthesis of development~ in the world economy over the pa~t 15 to 20 years, with thoughtful analysis and generous statistics to support it. Five economic processes arc seen to constitute the main context for international development in GLOBAL CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE. The first two --the end of the cold war and new relations among advanced capitalist powers --constitute the structure for the new global system: while incrca~cd globalization of trade and production, shifting patterns of international finance, and new ideological currents that revolve around market-orientation constitute the main link~ that unite core countries and their peripheral area~. Defining development a~ economic growth plus equity, the authors argue that the developing country hierarchy that emerged in the 1980s, with the conversion of a handful ofEa~t A~ian countries into newly industrialized powerhouses, wa~ closely a~sociatcd to this international context. As well, because developing countries were a~sociatcd predominantly with one or another of the dominant powers of advanced capitalism, the United States, Japan, or Europe, such regional link~ also had major consequences for development. Indeed, a premise of this book is that the Japanese model of development is more conducive to bring forth rapid growth with equity than that promoted by the United States and the international financial institutions.
With the collapse of state socialism, cleavages in the world economy turned toward differences in the styles of capitalism and the growing differences among the United States and its Japanese and European rivals. The latter two seemed clearly more dynamic in productivity and growth. In the ca~c of Japan, its savings and investment propensities, time horizons, the collaborative relationships between public and private sectors a~ well a~ between labor and capital, and views about security and equality, made it evident that capitalism is not the same across the globe. This book's detailed analysis of the effects on developing countries of belonging to one or another region of the world is quite revealing. While Africa ha~ been largely detached from the world economy and runs the risk of marginalization, A~ian countries have been successfully integrated to the Japanese economy in ways that have allowed those countries to experience substantial economic growth and equity. Latin America is somewhere in between, with higher levels of integration than Africa's.
[Page 347] Journal of World-Systems Research
Transnational corporations have become the main agent~ in the globalization process through production and trade, while new capital flows arc dominated by various economic actors. These include the international financial institutions, (lFls, namely, the International Monetary Fund, or IMF; and the World Bank), owners of direct foreign investment and portfolio capital, and governments controlling lFls and official development aid from advanced industrial nations. Where direct foreign investment (DFl) predominates a~ the form of capital flow, there may be an overlap with the first link of an integrated production and trade. One problem for developing countries is that capital flows have tended to concentrate among advanced industrial countries, with the proportion incrca~ing from 58% in the early 1980s to 86% at the end of the decade.
But some foreign capital wa~ still flowing toward third world countries. Put schematically, such capital flows changed during the 1980s from private loans to public loans and direct foreign investment. Latin America saw an incrca~cd flow dominated by portfolio capital, Asia by direct foreign investment, and Africa by grants and concessional loans. The type of foreign investment flowing into developing countries had a major impact on their prospects for development. Even though DFl wa~ seen a~ the worse type of international capital in the early 1970s, at the climax of the import substitution industrialization policies in Latin America, there wa~ a major rca~scssmcnt after the debt crisis. This wa~ due to the fact that DFl ha~ a much longer term outlook than portfolio capital. By contra~t, portfolio capital investments arc made with short term views, may cause appreciation of the currency, and can leave the country a~ soon a~ they entered.
Regional responses to the international context for development have shaped the impact of global variables. For Latin America, the combined decline of Soviet and European support with incrca~cd U.S. direct foreign investment ha~ lead to incrca~cd U.S. hegemony. By the 1980s this ha~ meant an incrca~cd influence of ncolibcralism in shaping economic policy, which ha~ also resulted in slow growth and greater inequality. In each third world region there ha~ come to prevail a different meaning of market orientation. While in Asia such orientation ha~ been shaped by Japanese capitalism, which includes a substantial state intervention and protectionism of key sectors, Latin America and Africa have followed the Anglo-U.S. lead of capitalism, which ha~ involved ma~sivc privatizations and an almost indiscriminate market opening to foreign competition. lncrca~cd economic importance of Japan and the European Union combined with a decline of U.S. military importance have led to two competing views on how the new global economic system will work. One cmpha~izcs multilateral convergence and trilateral management, while the other stresses rcgionalization into three competing blocs. This book argues that a combination of traits is materializing, simultaneously involving conflict and cooperation, divergence and convergence.
[Page 348] Journal of World-Systems Research Barbara Stallings's concluding chapter provides a most interesting elaboration of the mechanisms of influence of the new global economic system in terms of relationships among third world countries and their respective core countries, a~ well a~ among the triad of core blocs. By building a "tetrahedron" of such relationships, she offers an analysis ba~cd on figures of trade, direct foreign investment, and official development a~sistancc. Trade links arc strongest in the countries led by Japan and the United States but weak for Europe. Trade by multinational corporations data is fragmentary, but evidence suggests that an incrca~ing amount of international trade is carried out within firms. This in turn suggests that intrafirm trade raises barriers to entry, which incrca~cs the value for developing countries to establish link~ with multinationals a~ a way to obtain access to markets.
As mentioned previously, there is an enormous disparity in the distribution of direct foreign investment in the tetrahedron. Japan comes out a~ the country that sends the largest proportion of its direct investment to the other two core economic regions: 4 7% to the United States and 23% to Europe. The United States sends 36% to Europe but only 2% to Japan, while Europe sends only 13% of its direct foreign investment to the United States and about l % to Japan. This means that J apancsc investment is almost all financed domestically through its high savings rate, while European countries invest in countries within their own region. The United States, by contra~t, ha~ come to rely incrca~ingly on outsiders, which introduces a source of international instability and friction.
Japan also comes out a~ the most generous of the three core regions in tcrn1s of official dcvelopmcnt" (a('(a('(a('(at'(a('@'?@ncc, sending 62% to its integrated countries in A~ia, while Europe sends 47% to Africa, and the United States only 12% to Latin America. To the extent that these flows arc regulated by IFis such a~ the IMF and the World Bank rather than governments, they have a dramatic impact in tcm1s of imposing ncolibcral ideology. More generally, this book holds the hypothesis that "the policy packages (models) selected by third world countries will resemble those advocated by the countries that buy their goods, supply their finance, and provide their ideological guidance" (365).
Prospects for developing countries will similarly vary according to how they each responds to global trends. In Asia, the NICs arc now major players and, a~ a group, they already exceed Japan's invcsm1cnt in other Asian countries, although they still lag behind invcsm1cnt~ in other countries and technological capacity. In all likelihood, though, they will play a major role in integrating China and Indochina into the A~ian regional economy. The situation for Latin American countries is much more heterogeneous in tcrn1s of their potential for hemispheric integration, and it also depends on whether the U.S. Congress will agree to preferential trade relations with more of its southern neighbors beyond Mexico. Finally, there is a strong concern that Africa will be further displaced by the European Union in favor of Central and Ea~tcrn Europe. In the long run, a strengthened South Africa might provide an important growth pole capable of integrating some of the Sub-Saharan countries, but this may be well into the future. In addition, argues Stallings, "parts of South A~ia, the Middle Ea~t, and even Latin America could also end up in this group" of marginalized states (386).
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This book represent a great advancement in the description and explanation of global economic processes, but its focus tends too be almost exclusively economic. The editor of this collection wa~ explicit in her introduction about important a~pcct~ that were excluded from analysis: democratization, ethnic and religious conflicts, and environmental problems. Obviously one cannot expect that all relevant a~pccts of development will be treated in a single volume. But my critique centers not so much on the absences but in the selected approach to dealing with the problems addressed. Throughout the book it is a~sumcd that states arc the only valid actors in making policy choices. lt is only in the la~t page of the book that the editor acknowledges that some bottom-up approaches may emerge in searching for alternative development paths. Even on this point, though, the implication remains that states from developing countries will be the ones looking, for instance, for alternative development partners. The book docs not take into account that the social consequences of ncolibcralism arc bringing forth new social forces emerging from civil society, rather than the state. Invigorated social movements may thus become effective forces which states will have to reckon with in formulating policy. Ncolibcralism is becoming incrca~ingly contested and the social and political problems it is causing may dctcnninc that its days ( or years?) arc counted.
This critique, however, shrinks when compared to the accomplishments of GLOBAL CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE. This book will become standard reference for any serious student of development in the age of globalization. lt is a must-read for specialists, and it could be fruitfully used in upper division and graduate courses of development economics and economic sociology. l give it my strongest recommendation.
[ all of human history and prehistory, but all of the most important transformations that have occurred on earth over the pa~t four billion years! And he nearly pull~ it off. Snooks formulates a model that he variously calls MATERIALIST MAN or DYNAMIC MATERIALISM. This model a~sumcs that both genetic and social change arc driven by a similar mechanism, which is the desire to gain control over resources so a~ to maximize the probability of survival and material prosperity. Applied specifically to humans, Snooks?s model holds that humans have an innate desire to incrca~c their wealth and power. Indeed, he claims that they have an insatiable desire to accumulate material possessions. The history and prehistory of human societies is therefore a complex talc in which humans have adopted one or another of four ba~ic strategics in order to achieve their objectives: family multiplication, technological advance, conquest, and commerce. Societies may use more than one of these, but one is usually dominant, especially in the most successful societies. Strategics arc chosen for their effectiveness, within the total context of social, cultural, and historical circumstances, in promoting economic well-being and growth. However, any given strategy will eventually exhaust its potentialities, and a new one must then be taken up.
The strategy ofF AMIL Y MULTIPLICATION wa~ the dominant strategy of achieving economic well-being throughout all of human prehistory. It involved producing offapring who would eventually migrate and fill up surrounding territories. According to Snooks, this gave humans greater control over natural resources through the extended family. The big problem with this strategy wa~ that, although it permitted a certain level of material well-being, it wa~ unable to generate any real economic growth or raise living standards. As a result, other strategics came into the picture.
One of these was the TECHNOLOGY strategy, which involves the invention and deployment of new or better tools and techniques. It was often used throughout human history, but usually only as a subsidiary strategy. As a primary strategy, it has been most notably employed in Europe between about AD 1000 and 1500, and then again in Europe beginning with the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century. Why has it been so little employed? Snooks?s answer is that it was generally too expensive in comparison to other strategics. Snooks is highly critical of the conventional assumption made by historians that the agrarian civilizations of the ancient world gave little emphasis to technological advance because they were essentially uninterested in economic growth. They were keenly interested in such growth, he says, but had more cost-effective ways of achieving it.
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The most important of these other growth-inducing strategics was CONQUEST. This involved the military invasion of other societies and their incorporation into the political structure of the conquering state. The economic benefits of this strategy were many, including ?additional agricultural land; additional labour in the form of slaves and soldiers; additional fixed capital in the form of captured military equipment, irrigation systems, buildings, transport facilities, etc.; treasure; and additional tax revenue? (p. 276). This strategy was preferred to all others because it was the most cost-efficient and produced the greatest return on investment. In order to achieve this return, ancient civilizations had to give emphasis to one form of technological advance, that involving military technology. The advance of military technology in the ancient world occurred, Snooks says, because war was not a game but a business, and in fact a very big business.
In his explication of the conquest strategy, Snooks discusses at length the Assyrians, the Macedonians, and the Romans as leading examples. But China, he argues, did not really follow this strategy, and in fact could not follow it, because of a lack of suitable surrounding societies that were worth conquering. China instead relied mainly on the family multiplication and technological strategics at various points in its history.
Conquest produced great material gain for its conquerers, but on a global scale it was a zero-sum game. The remaining strategy, though, that of COMMERCE, was capable of allowing societies to break out of this zero-sum straightjackct. The commerce strategy is, for Snooks, essentially one of trade. It could only be effectively employed by societies that had a favorable geographical location, such as on a major body of water, or along the path of a land trading route. Societies in highly geographically and economically differentiated regions might also benefit from trade. Snooks?s leading examples arc ancient Mesopotamia, Minoan society, the Phoenicians, classical Athens, the Italian city-states of Venice and Genoa at the time of the Renaissance, and Europe between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.
I found THE DYNAMIC SOCIETY to be an extremely provocative read and compelling in many ways. In my view one of the most compelling features of the book is its resolute materialism. Snooks not only defends his MATERIALIST MAN against what he regards as the conventional view of social scientists and historians, MORAL/POLITICAL MAN, but he grounds his economic materialism in a deeper Darwinian materialism. Humans, for Snooks, arc Darwinian organisms, which is to say that they have been built for a struggle for survival and a maximization of material advantage. It seems to me that this grounding assumption is not only fundamentally correct, but absolutely necessary to a proper understanding of the nature of human society, its historical evolution, and its future possibilities.
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Snooks?s model of MATERIALIST MAN leads him to many crucial insights. One of the most important is his argument that people usually do not struggle for power for its own sake, but rather seek it because it will promote the realization of material advantage. Power, he says, is largely about economics. Perhaps the best example of this is war. Snooks has exactly the right response to Wcbcrian theorists like Michael Mann who assert that the military objectives of agrarian civilizations were essentially independent of economic objectives. War in the agrarian world, Snooks tells us, was all about economics, because conquest wa~ the most cost-efficient strategy of material gain.
But although I have found Snooks?s broad outline of the flow of human history quite compelling, I have some serious reservations regarding a number of details. I would question, for example, his notion of family multiplication a~ a general economic strategy followed in Paleolithic societies. What Snooks seems to mean by this is population incrca~c in order to provide an adequate labor force. Such a strategy certainly makes sense in situations where labor is scarce, but the real problem for Paleolithic and early Neolithic societies is too many people, not too few. A great deal of anthropological and archaeological evidence suggests that societies at these evolutionary levels arc far more preoccupied with controlling numbers than with expanding them. And how, exactly, would family multiplication work in such societies? Among hunter-gatherers and horticulturalists, for example, when a camp or village begins to press too severely against resources a new camp or village will be hived off and go its own separate way, thus having little interaction with the original settlement. Later in the book (p. 227) Snooks docs acknowledge the existence of family planning a~ an alternative to family multiplication, but this appears suddenly out of nowhere and is never systematically theorized.
Moreover, Snooks is not very clear about just why humans abandoned the family multiplication strategy in favor of one of the others. Part of his answer scc1rn to be the inability of technologically primitive societies to raise living standards beyond a minimal level. But this is extremely questionable. Evidence marshalled by anthropologist~ and archaeologists in recent years suggest~ that living standards were actually higher, a~ mca~urcd by nutrition and health, among Paleolithic hunter-gatherers than among Neolithic horticulturalists and later agriculturalist~. And why? Because of growing population pressure, which itselfwa~ very likely the cause of the shift to cultivation in the first place. In fact, Snooks seems to have a general misunderstanding of the relationship between technological development and the standard of living. He insists, for example, that the successful employment of the conquest strategy in ancient civilizations raised the standard of living for everyone. But this is very difficult to accept. Most pca~ant farmers in agrarian civilizations were worse off, sometimes much worse off, than both early Neolithic cultivators and Paleolithic hunter-gatherers. The standard of living has generally DECLINED throughout human history and prehistory, at least for the average individual, and it was only with the rise of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution that living standards began to rise dramatically for the mass of the population.
[Page 353] Journal of World-Systems Research I also have some questions regarding Snook?s specific employment of his four economic strategics. To take just one of the more prominent examples, consider Snooks?s claim that Europe between AD l 000 and 1500 relied heavily on the technology strategy. To support his claim he is able to cite numerous examples of technological development during this time, but isn?t it just as logical, if not more logical, to regard European societies at this time as employing the commerce strategy. William McNcill has argued that the world as a whole experienced a tremendous jump in the level of commerce after AD l 000, and certainly Europe, in particular the Italian city-states of Venice and Genoa, was a huge part of this commercial thrust. In fuct, why separate the technology and commerce strategics in this ca~c. Could it not be pcrsua~ively argued that Europe wa~ using technological advance to promote a commerce strategy, just a~ the ancient civilizations promoted the development of military technology to support their conquest strategics? And what about the period since the Industrial Revolution? Once again Snooks refers to this period a~ one characterized by the use of the technology strategy, but could we not argue that it wa~ really the commerce strategy --perhaps better labeled the CAPITALIST strategy, since it wa~ world production a~ well a~ world trade that wa~ involved --that wa~ dominant and being served by technological advance?
Snooks is an economic historian, and THE DYNAMIC SOCIETY reads like it wa~ written by one. There is certainly nothing wrong with that, but Snooks gets himself into trouble by seldom if ever looking at world history a~ a sociologist would. A~ already indicated, I agree with the rational choice grounding a~sumptions of this book, but one cannot simply stop there. This book seems to contain ONLY individuals, there being little if any recognition of the importance of social cla~scs and economic inequalities a~ strongly implicated in world historical development. A glaring example of this absence involves Snook?s analysis of Roman conquest. As he puts it, ?Conquest wa~ a business pursued to achieve the materialistic ends of ALL ROMAN CITIZENS? (p. 293; cmpha~is added). ALL ROMAN CITIZENS?I Docs Snooks really believe that the needs and concerns of all Roman citizens, rather than those of Roman elites, were being considered by the Roman polity in its mapping out of its objectives? Indeed he docs, for he says at the beginning of the book that ?the dynamics of human society arises from the decision making not just of small elites but of all members of society both male and female throughout the world? (p. xiv). Although elites may capture a disproportionate share of the economic surplus, he says, they merely express the general desires of humanity. If we shift our focus from the ancient world to modern times, we run into a similar problem. The modern world, many would say, is quintessentially a capitalist world, but capitalists arc strangely absent from Snook?s view of this world. There arc just individuals pursuing their economic objectives, all of which arc the same. Having said this, it will come a~ no surprise to readers of this review that Snooks makes no mention of world-system theory or any of its formulators, a glaring omission it seems to me.
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Since I am running out of space, let me make just two more critical points. I find highly pcrsua~ivc Snook?s claim that societies select economic strategics on the ba~is of what will produce, under particular historical and social circumstances, the best material results for the lowest costs. I think he is right that the conquest strategy wa~ the principal strategy of the ancient world because it wa~ economically superior to the commerce and technology strategics. However, Snooks provides precious little, if any, empirical evidence to support this view, or for his view of the superiority of the other strategics under different circmrntanccs. Snooks argues his ca~c well, but hardheaded empiricists will be put off by the lack of any convincing hard data to back up his argument.
Finally, it should be noted that Snooks comes off a~ a radical anticnvironmcntalist. He is openly hostile to the view of scientists like Meadows, Meadows, and Randcrs in their book BEYOND THE LIMITS that we need to be slowing economic growth and reducing environmental depletion or face possible cata~trophc in the next century. For Snooks, this is the worst possible prescription, for it would reduce the intense competitive pressures that have been responsible for economic growth throughout world history. And he is certain that humans will be able to respond to the current challenge with the technological means to make con tinned economic growth possible. He could be right, of course, but much more caution seems to be called for. Never before ha~ human society been confronted with the kind of ecological impact that the current economic system is generating, and never before ha~ the time period within which ma~sivc technological change is required been so short. The current situation is, therefore, unlike all its predecessors, and that should not be taken lightly. My grand conclusions on Snooks arc therefore mixed, but I have to admit that I found this book tremendously exciting. Who should read it9 Quite simply, all scholars who arc concerned with BIG HISTORY, whatever their theoretical orientation or political stripe. It should have a wide audience, and will be both vigorously defended by some and bitterly attacked by others. I am well aware that its Darwinian and rational choice foundations will be strongly resisted by world-system theorists, but I have long believed that these arc exactly the right a~sumptions for world-system theorists to adopt. Indeed, for me world-system theory only makes sense in light of such a~sumptions. And this should be especially the ca~c for those, such a~ Frank, Cha~c-Dunn, and Hall, who wish to posit world-system-like activities thousands of years earlier than AD 1500. Lct9s face it, this is what humans arc like whether we like it or not. This little book contains testimony of individual~ from Japan, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sudan, Jamaica, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Brazil affiliated with universities, independent research institutes and other NGOs. It contains an eloquent statement from a farmer from Japan. It concludes with a document of indictment, which summarizes the ca~c against the G-7 in straightforward language. Testimonies cover
The testimonies arc uneven. Some arc excellent and well documented. Others critique the capitalist development process generally and at lea~t one (Budiman) presents a list of major debtor countries suggesting that Indonesia ranks second only to India in total international indebtedness. The table docs not list either Brazil or Mexico, both of which have larger debts than Indonesia.
SAPs arc agreed to by the debtor country a~ a condition for receiving a SAL (Structural Adjustment Loan) from the IMF. Generally, other lending is keyed on approval of the SAL and acceptable progress toward fulfilling the SAP. The SAPs generally contain specifics for accomplishing the following: reduction of the size of the government and the fiscal deficit, privatization of particular government enterprises, liberalization of foreign investment, and "getting prices right" including currency devaluation, substantial tariff and domestic subsidy reduction.
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While presenters agree that the import-substitution statist approaches previously pursued by many Third World governments had ultimately failed the ma~ses. However, they argue, the SAPs were designed above all else to ensure that transnational corporations (TNCs) could operate freely throughout the Third World. While ostensibly designed to encourage more efficient production and delivery of services in debtor countries, citizens in those countries wa~ not served by the SAPs"?neither in the short nor the longer term. Presenters at the Tribunal suggest the following rea~ons: 1) The SAPs result in debtor countries "eating their seed corn." Investments in human capital (including both educational and health services) and infra~tructure have been curtailed sharply in many countries in order to shrink government. Jennifer Jones, a Jamaican NGO leader, shows that the percentage of the Jamaican national budget represented by the Ministries of Construction (Roads and Housing), Public Utilities and Transport, Agriculture, and Youth and Community Development, and Local Government declined by from half to 70% from the 1970s to the 1990s. Per capita expenditures for education and for health declined by about 1/5. Only the percentages for the Ministry ofNational Security and the Ministry of Finance grew. The latter, which manages and pays the national external debt, represented over half the total budget by the early 1990s.
2) Isagani Serrano, Vice President of the Philippines Rural Reconstruction Movement, point~ out that "getting the prices right" is a good deal more complicated, because of externalities, than is suggested by the free marketers. He point~ out, "Structural adjustment wa~ just a~ environmentally blind a~ the previous State-dominated structures that it wa~ trying to undo" (p. 109), and argues that cutting back spending "undermined the government's capacity for environmental management" (p. 114). He also admits that South Korea cut down 1/3 of its forests while pursuing a successful state-led Export Oriented Industrialization. One might conclude that the culprit with respect to environmental degradation may be economic growth, but the SAPs offer no solution. More broadly, if the SAPs ultimately serve the interests of the TNCs at the expense of the people in debtor countries, then one would not expect the internalization of cxtcrnalitics"?whcthcr they be deteriorating infra~tructurc, human capital erosion, or environmental dcgradation"?in "getting the prices right." In order to make payments on the external debt, the government (lacking a fiscal surplus), issued bonds to purcha~c hard currency from exporters. This incrca~cd the Brazilian government's domestic debt and triggered inflation. Efforts to dampen that inflation brought recession. Annual GDP growth wa~ 1.7% in the 1980s"?less than the population growth rate. Poverty grew more than 50% over the decade. And by 1989, Brazil's debt had actually grown to $ll5 billion. Two sectors in Brazil did quite wcll--cxportcrs and the financial sector, who were able to make considerable sums through speculation. By the 1990s, Brazil had the greatest income inequality of any country in the world. Soares concludes by saying that structural adjustment and its nco-libcral policies have not provided a ba~c for new development, but rather have eroded the previously developed productive and institutional structure and technological capabilities.
4) The Tribunal's "Indictment" docs a good job of discussing the relationships which have weakened the ability of indebted Third World countries to provide for their people: The G-7 desires to remain dominant through the "constant expansion of global capital" (p. 126). However, the global expansion of capital reduces the power of the G-7 nations, a~ they have become "front men for global capital" (p. 127). The World Bank is also a servant to the TN Cs rather than "serving the common good," a~ wa~ the GATT (now the World Trade Organization--WTO). lndictmcnts include violation of Articles 23, 26, and 25, which forbid denial of the right to work, the right to education and the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well being; usurpation of the sovereignty guaranteed member states in the UN Charter through the imposition of SAPs via secret negotiations and rulings by the lMF and World Bank; etc. These violations arc presented in more detail in an introductory essay by Richard Falk, international legal scholar.
While the indictments arc well argued, the call to action may be satisfying to those who made it, but not very realistic politically. Organized citizen groups arc exhorted to demand compensation from the responsible institutions to those who were harmed by SAPs, and to obtain recognition by G-7 leaders of their of personal responsibility for the suffering that structural adjustment ha~ caused. Ba~cd on a secret analysis by the lMF of 66 SAPs which apparently shows almost a total failure to achieve their fiscal, monetary, income growth, and debt reduction objectives, the Tribunal suggest~ that the lMF be required to compensate "SAPpcd" countries through debt reduction for the harm done by SAPs to people and that the World Bank compensate persons harmed by its failed projects.
[Page 358] Journal of World-Systems Research While these arc interesting idea~, l would have been more satisfied if there had also been analysis of possible contradictions in the system and of the circumstances under which the G-7, the World Bank, or others might be persuaded to counter the power of the TN Cs. Perhaps, with organized citizen pressure, issues like global wanning could become a cause for which the G-7 countries, in their own self interest, would discard free market concepts and provide grants to Third World countries and to their farmers, indigenous peoples, and others to encourage for reducing pollution reduction and rain forest conservation. At what point, given the incrca~cd capacity and pressure for the World Bank to evaluate projects it supports, will the World Bank conclude that the principles behind the SAPs"?and eventually the globalizing development model which underlies the SAPs--must be radically altered? There arc efforts within the Bank to change the corporate culture from an engineering mentality to one which gives greater importance to social result~. How successful those efforts will be is unclear, and may depend also on citizen pressure for internalizing the externalities generated by the TN Cs. Only once in this book arc the NGO coalitions mentioned which have grown up around the major UN Conferences of the pa~t decade on women, the environment, food security, etc. How might they contribute to such citizen pressure?
This book is aimed at activists, and is written in straightforward prose. It is also appropriate a~ a textbook in advanced undergraduate courses a~ well a~ graduate courses on international development and related topics. At the graduate level it should be supplemented by other readings on Globalization. I expect to a~sign the four chapters I cited above in the introductory part of my graduate rural development course. Although the "Indictment" chapter ha~ shortcomings, it should generate a healthy discussion on the relationship among actors in the Globalization process and regarding appropriate tactics for diminishing or reorienting the global power ofTNCs. The stated goal of DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT is to provide an interdisciplinary overview to issues of Third World development. Lewellen likens the task to a guided tour through the Metropolitan Museum of Art; it is intended to provide a background to a vast and varied subject and a "mental map" for more-focused return visits. The book begins by addressing various terms used to refer to the poorer nations of the world. After explaining the origin of the term "Third World," its pejorative nature, and the inadequacy of other alternatives (i.e., less developed countries, the periphery, developing nations, the South), Lewellen concludes that all arc inadequate yet none arc avoidable. After this insightful discussion, I was surprised that he classifies the poorest countries as "the Fourth World," since this classification perpetuates the terminology he deems problematic.The rest of the first chapter discusses features common to most Third World nations --poverty, economic dependency, soft states, population growth --and provides a clear sense of what is to follow. Chapter two contains a "brief history" of major Third World regions (Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa) which, while perhaps necessary, comes off like a tedious history lesson.Major theories of development, namely modernization and dependency perspectives arc the focus of chapter three.Herc the author is careful to distinguish among the variants of each (such as the ECLA model, dependency theory, and world system thcory).This brief but lucid presentation is well-summarized with a detailed chart of major paradigms and concludes with a call for a greater synthesis of these perspectives.Chapters four and five rise to this call by focusing first on domestic economics and internal factors and then the international economy and external factors in facilitating or impeding development.Chapter five is more cohesive than chapter four and includes one of the best short summaries of the debt crisis and foreign aid to date. These first five chapters provide the new student of development with a succinct and well-organized introduction to Third World development but also serve a~ comprehensive review for the informed reader.At times, the text gets bogged down in the tension between generalization and detail. The author tends to list numerous countries with little or no claborationin lieu of detailed examples of main point~.For example, in a discussionofuncqual exchange and raw material exports, eleven countries arc prcscntcdin less than one page. Similarly, four short paragraphs on land reform covcrthc experiences of eight countries.In other ca~cs, statistics arc prcscntcdfor the Third World a~ a whole without acknowledgement of the diversity thatis ma~kcd by such summary statistics.Neither strategy works very well.A more reader-friendly approach would have been to present one or twocountry-spccific examples in greater detail and leave the categorization of numerous countries to charts or figures.
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The remaining chapters focus on specific topics --politics, population, environmental problems and human rights --in a Third World context.Each of these chapters could ca~ily stand alone and they vary in terms of coverage.Chapter seven on population is interesting and inclusive while chapter six on politics is fragmented and misses some major issues.Herc, the discussion of strong and weak states is severely limited and there is no mention of the rich civil society that pervades the political sphere in much of the Third World.Although the topic ha~ been the focus of much recent theorizing across many disciplines, it is curiously absent from this volume.In chapters six through ten, a~ in earlier ones, greater use of charts and figures to present statistics would have aided the reader. A~ a comprehensive overview to Third World development, the book is largely successful.It cncompa~scs a wide range of theoretical approaches and topics in a concise and well-organized text.Lewellen clarifies terms for the novice but avoids oversimplification in the presentation of most issues.For this rca~on, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT should appeal to a diverse audience.It is appropriate for use in general undergraduate cla~scs on development a~ well a~ more advanced graduate-level courses. The book ha~ two weaknesses.First, it only partially achieves the stated goal of being "truly interdisciplinary" (p. x). On one hand, Lewellen, a cultural anthropologist includes a cultural perspective that is missing from many development textbooks.This wa~ a welcome addition. Y ct, the contributions of many well-known sociologists of development (i.e., John Walton, Alejandro Portes, Stephen Bunker, Charles Ragin) arc neglected in the text and arc completely absent from the suggested readings and bibliography.While an interdisciplinary overview of the broad, multi-faceted topic of Third World development is an enormous undertaking, it might have been accomplished with more disciplinary balance. Finally, a~ guide for more focused study on a specific region or issue the book falls short.The text contains few citations for follow-up reading.Often the author refers to "some theorists" or "a group of scholars" without providing references.Some sections cite one or two works repeatedly instead of providing a variety of references on the topic. The suggested readings provided at the end of each chapter, although useful, do not make up for the lack of cited material.They include too many general overviews or reports (such a~ the World Bank's World Development Report) and too few academic books and articles.Nonetheless, the books strengths --its comprehensive scope and well-organized format --outweigh these shortcomings.A~ a result, it should find a place in many courses on Third World development. Reviewed by Frances V. Moulder, Social Sciences Department, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Norwich, Connecticut, USA AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORLD SYSTEM PERSPECTNE is the second edition of a text first published in 1989. The author's objective, a~ stated in the Preface to the first edition, is to "provide students with an accessible introduction to world system theory that is firmly embedded in history." Although aimed at undergraduates, the book will also be of interest to graduate students and others who arc looking for a guide into the large amount of theoretical and empirical work in the field.
The book covers the following topics: origins of world system theory; defining characteristics of the world system: history of the world system: structure of the present world system: processes of change: contemporary developments in world system analysis; criticisms of world system theory: and the author's own evaluation of the perspective. Changes from the first edition include addition of a chapter on ''New Directions in World System Analysis," and various revisions to reflect changes in the periphery and semi-periphery, dismantling of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War. Shannon also states in the Preface to the second edition that he ha~ attempted to "correct some unintentionally harsh statements in my final evaluation of the perspective that seem to have misled readers about where my general theoretical sympathies lie."
A strength of this book a~ a textbook is that it attempt~ to address comprehensively the entire range of concerns of world system analysis. Most of the other available undergraduate texts arc more narrowly focused on the economic development of the periphery (e.g. John Isbister, PROMISES NOT KEPT: Philip McMichacl, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE; Alvin Y. So, SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT) or on specific world issues (e.g. York W. Bradshaw and Michael Wallace, GLOBAL INEQUALITIES).
In contra~t, Shannon deals systematically with the core and semi-periphery, a~ well a~ the periphery, and with a range of concerns, including methodological questions, the issue of pre-modern world systems, hegemonic struggles, the decline of core nations, etc.
The new chapter on ''New Directions in World System Analysis" is a definite enhancement. It deals with the analysis of race, gender and culture in the world system; methodological issues; and the debates over the existence and nature of earlier world systems. This chapter demonstrates the continued growth and vitality of the world system perspective. I hope that Shannon will expand the chapter in future editions to include efforts underway to apply the perspective in other area~ such a~ analysis of the environment, urbanization and social movements.
[Page 362] Journal of World-Systems Research Shannon's chapters on the defining charac tcristics and history of the world system arc especially useful. I know ofno other source with so much of the relevant information so clearly stated for an undergraduate audience. I used the first edition several times in courses for advanced undergraduates. Students were invariably grateful to Shannon for helping them understand the history of the world a~ a coherent system rather than a~ a confusing array of disconnected or random events and personalities.
Shannon ha~ worked to make the book acccssibl c to student readers. He states in the Preface to the first edition, "I havc ... avoidcd a~suming very much prior background on the part of the reader. I have learned that one cannot a~sumc even the most ba~ic historical or geographic knowledge when addressing an undergraduate audience." Despite these efforts, the text is probably best suited to well-prepared, higher level students --advanced undergraduates and graduate students. In my experience, those who have not taken some combination of college-level courses in economics, history and sociology find this book somewhat overwhelming, rather than challenging. For example, the chapters on history, although lucid, arc still too abstract for readers with little knowledge of world history. Other chapters require a prior introduction to economic terminology. For example, the following concepts arc introduced without explanation in chapter 1, "The Origins ofWorld System Theory" --commercialization, capital investment, infra~tructurc, subcomponents, industrialization, etc. In fairness to Shannon, the book's failure to be more accessible to less advanced undergraduates is partly an outcome of the book's topic, i.e. it is a book about the world system PERSPECTNE, not a book about the WORLD SYSTEM. Since the world system perspective is a revision of prior thinking in most of the social sciences, it cannot be fully appreciated without knowledge of the thinking it ha~ rejected or synthesized in a new way. If someone were to attempt to write an accessible undergraduate text on the WORLD SYSTEM, they would be freer to write for a wider audience. Interestingly, such book~ arc beginning to appear at the K-12 levcl! (Sec, for example, Iftikhar Ahmad ct al., WORLD CULTURES: A GLOBAL MOSAIC. This is a social studies text for middle school student~ which contains insights from the world system perspective (Prentice Hall, 1993) . Ahmad is a researcher at the F crnand Brandel Center and ha~ a Ph.D. in Sociology from Binghamton University.)
In sum, Shannon's book is a fine text for advanced undergraduate courses cmpha~izing the world system perspective, and an excellent reference for graduate students and others interested in the perspective. I trust that it will be a popular text, and hope Shannon will continue to update the book and keep it in print for future USC.
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